Budget ax falls on U.S. air defenses

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, exposed gaping holes in the nation's air security, the U.S. military took steps to dramatically increase its ability to intercept hostile aircraft.

Chief among those: Station fighter jets at strategic points across the continental United States, with the goal of being able to intercept a hijacked plane or unfriendly aircraft within 20 minutes of identifying the threat.

In the months after the attacks, the United States nearly quadrupled the number of fighter alert sites from seven to 26. Since then, however, the number has shrunk to 16 in the continental United States, including one at Homestead Air Reserve Base in South Florida, plus one each in Hawaii and Alaska.

Now, the U.S. Air Force's budget for the next fiscal year reduces that further, eliminating the requirement at two sites that jets and pilots be on alert 24 hours a day.

The reduction raises the longstanding issue of whether resources are sufficient for the nation's air defense. A Government Accountability Office report issued two weeks ago said studies by the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, show "the probability of success of an attack increased as the number of … sites decreased."

Officials on Tuesday did not reveal which alert sites would be affected, though the Air Force said in an email to The Tampa Tribune that it conducted an analysis to find the two sites that "constituted the least impact to the NORAD Aerospace Control mission."

Those bases will not be closed, and 24-hour alerts could be restored if intelligence indicates a higher threat level.

NORAD in 2010 studied whether it could change the number and location of its fighter sites without affecting the military's ability to defend the country against airborne attack, the January GAO report stated.

"However the (NORAD) analysis did not identify potential cost savings that could result from eliminating a given number of sites,'' the GAO report states.

"Should NORAD, DOD (the Department of Defense) or Congress consider modifying the number and location of … sites in the future, without an analysis that balances both risk and costs, decision makers will be unable to make fully informed decisions about whether the potential cost savings (or increase) warrants the corresponding increase (or decrease) in risk."

The Jan. 31 GAO report said the annual cost for each fighter unit to conduct air sovereignty alert operations ranged from $2 million to $8 million, with the average about $5 million. Those fighter units also have non-air-defense roles, including overseas assignments.

During the Cold War, the Air Force and the Air National Guard retained a robust number of air defense interceptor sites to counter the Soviet threat — about 75 during the Cuban Missile Crisis — along with Air Force and U.S. Army surface-to-air missile sites.

Most were gradually phased out as the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile threat replaced bombers as the primary concern. Later, the fall of the Soviet Union reduced fears of a nuclear attack.

Since 9/11, the U.S. government has enhanced airline passenger screening and hardened commercial aircraft cockpit doors; established restricted flight zones, in particular around Washington, D.C., and during special events such as the Super Bowl; and developed expectations that airline passengers would act against potential hijackers.

"As a result of these efforts, the Transportation Security Administration believes that a hijacking scenario over the United States remains a possibility although it is less likely to occur today," the GAO said.

The GAO added that other threats continue to emerge and evolve, including those using ultralight and general aviation aircraft and cruise missiles.

U.S. Army Gen. Charles H. Jacoby Jr., said in a Senate committee questioning in 2011 before his appointment as commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command that current U.S. continental air defense capabilities are adequate.