The desperation of an Afghan deal

illustrating Afghan corruption, Pakistani duplicity and Taliban toughness - revealed little that is new. But it will intensify a popular kind of desperation.

A consensus is growing among foreign policy realists, skittish NATO allies and anti-war activists that the time has come to cut a deal with the Taliban. The Afghan government is hopeless; recent elections were discrediting; nation-building has failed.

The only hope is to pursue not only reintegration of low- and mid-level Taliban fighters into Afghan society but reconciliation with Taliban leaders based in Pakistan. As long as these leaders end their relationship with al-Qaida - the only firm, non-negotiable red line - the Taliban could return to effective control of southern Afghanistan in a more decentralized system.

Some Afghans are preparing for this prospect - particularly those who find themselves on the wrong side of the red line. A typical "night letter" from the Taliban reads: "We warn you to leave your job as a teacher as soon as possible otherwise we will cut the heads off your children and we shall set fire to your daughter."

This debate is not only a conflict of two policy views but of two worlds. Recently, I attended a meeting of diplomats, foreign policy experts and journalists where a diplomatic settlement with the Taliban was broadly endorsed. Afghanistan, in the general view, had become a costly distraction from issues such as Iran and North Korea. Best to cut our losses and get out. Around the polished table, every participant was a well-dressed, Western man, casually condemning millions of poor and powerless women to fear and slavery.

Supporters of a settlement with the Taliban respond that they are just facing reality - that protecting the rights of Afghan women is desirable; it is simply not possible. In truth, they know no such thing. Those who predict defeat in Afghanistan significantly overlap with those who confidently predicted defeat in Iraq. Their military judgments merit some skepticism, particularly when American commanders are pursuing a new strategy in Afghanistan.

As it stands, the Taliban has every reason to think that it wins by enduring. A panting desire for a hasty deal only encourages this belief.

If the coalition does not insist on the protection of human rights as a precondition for negotiations, the whole thing gets much easier. It is always easy to end a conflict by giving in to the enemy. Reconciliation with the Taliban from a position of weakness - granting the Taliban control over portions of the country - bears a close resemblance to surrender. When asked last month about the possibility of an American settlement with the Taliban, CIA Director Leon Panetta responded: "We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce al-Qaida, where they would really try to become part of that society. We've seen no evidence of that and very frankly, my view is that with regards to reconciliation, unless they're convinced that the United States is going to win and that they're going to be defeated, I think it's very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that's going to be meaningful."

This is the realistic alternative: Win first, then negotiate.