Disquiet in the middle

Editorial

History shows no other system of government is superior to our blend of free enterprise and democracy, reinforced with constitutionally based protection of individual liberty and personal property.

Most of us consider these core issues settled, even as we spiritedly debate the particulars: the right level of help for the poor, the best tax rate, how to balance security and freedom, the smartest foreign policy, what to do about national debt and other important details, yet details nonetheless.

Some economists and political observers are worrying about something bigger, the possibility the values of the majority could fundamentally change if stresses on the middle class increase.

In an article in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs magazine, Francis Fukuyama poses a troubling question: "What if the further development of technology and globalization undermines the middle class and makes it impossible for more than a minority of citizens in an advanced society to achieve middle-class status?"

What the economist at Stanford is asking is academic and premature, but it's not the sort of question that should be allowed to take us by surprise: Can democracy survive the decline of the middle class?

This question goes beyond President Obama's vague harangue about the increase in economic inequality and former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney's complaint that Obama wants to make this country too much like a European social welfare state.

There's an important third side to the issue. The middle class appears to be losing ground in advanced economies in North America, Europe and East Asia. "Middle class" means educated people who are not rich and not poor but who own property and expect their children, if they apply themselves, to be able to enjoy a similar if not better lifestyle.

Fukuyama wants us to think about the reality that if the middle class faces a choice between protecting its own property and preserving broad participation in democracy, it might well choose property.

"In countries such as China and Thailand," he writes, "many middle-class people feel threatened by the redistributive demands of the poor and hence have lined up in support of authoritarian governments that protect their class interests."

As the middle class emerges in places like India, Brazil and Turkey, he asks us to consider what happens if our own middle class continues to stagnate or begins to erode.

It is unclear where they would turn. Democrats are wrong to assume economic discomfort and increasing inequality are sure to help the liberal cause.

Fukuyama correctly notes that "the left has not been able to make a plausible case for an agenda other than a return to an unaffordable form of old-fashioned social democracy."

Obama complains that the rich aren't doing enough to help the poor, but he leaves the working poor and middle class with no idea how he plans to reduce inequality and, if he did, how it could increase their pay.

No one is offering, Fukuyama says, either a "coherent analysis of what happens to the structure of advanced societies as they undergo economic change" or "a realistic agenda that has any hope of protecting a middle-class society."

Americans' best instincts will be to put their faith in freedom and democracy, as they always have. But only as long as the middle class believes those values are compatible will both be secure.